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I. Introduction
With an unprecedented run of economic growth producing an economy of $8.5 trillion,
the United States solidified its place as both the world's largest importer and exporter of goods
and services. Imports totaled $1.1 trillion, but the foreign financial crises led to a slowing of
export growth to $932 billion. International Monetary Fund (IMF) recovery packages gained
funding, but with trade conditionalities intended to deter government directed loans to certain
sectors. Worldwide, the rate of growth in world trade dropped from ten percent to four percent,
trade actions increased in many markets abroad, and steel imports into the United States surged,
precipitating unfair trade cases and heightened political pressure for escape dause relief.
The United States continued to advance trade liberalization initiatives in every region of
the world and maintained an aggressive effort to secure implementation and expansion of
multilateral obligations. Notable success was marked by the entry into force of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on basic telecommunications services on February 5,
which was preceded by additional commitments and the U.S. withdrawal of its broad most-
favored-nation (MFN) exception. In addition, the implementation of the newly negotiated
expansion of the Financial Services Agreement under the Uruguay Round's General Agreement
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on Trade in Services (GATS) began the process of opening access to ninety-five percent of
the world's revenue from banking, securities, insurance, and financial data services. The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) marked its fifth anniversary, and the hemisphere
saw the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations move past its formal
launching, but still hampered by the absence of U.S. legislation providing fast-track authority
for its future implementation.
While a multilateral convention negotiated within the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) requires member states to criminalize bribery, bringing other
industrialized countries to that U.S. standard, the level of foreign prosecutorial zeal may not
yet meet that in the United States, especially in those countries whose negotiators blocked the
convention from addressing the tax deductability of bribes, bribes to political parties, and other
issues. Issues involving sovereignty, labor, and the environment stopped efforts to secure a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MIA).
The United States remained the leading participant in WTO dispute settlement proceedings,
and with an enviable won-loss record. However, in three cases brought by the United States,
the new system produced determinations that proved difficult to implement. Two determinations
concerned European measures, one on beef hormones and the other on bananas, and the third
concerned a Canadian measure on periodicals. The persistence of resistance to bringing those
measures into conformity with the WTO may separately, or in combination, challenge the
new system's ability to deal satisfactorily with questionable implementation. With built-in
negotiations on agriculture and services, a legislated review of the dispute settlement system,
and matters such as the broad implementation of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIP Agreement) all nearly coinciding with a U.S.-hosted
Ministerial and an election year, the accomplishments and problems of 1998 may well provide
the basis for the next defining moment of the international trading system.
I!. WTO Dispute Settlement Activity
The caseload in the WTO dispute settlement system has become staggering. The actions
discussed here have been highlighted because they may have a broader impact on the dispute
settlement system and future cases. In addition to the reported decisions of panels and the
Appellate Body, the issue of implementation became a much more significant issue during
1998.
A. PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY DECISIONS
The panel and Appellate Body decisions can be grouped roughly into five substantive groups.
These involve decisions with respect to: (1) tariff schedule related matters; (2) TRIP; (3) sanitary
and phytosanitary matters; (4) Artide III matters; and (5) Artide XX matters. In addition,
there were some significant procedural matters decided. As noted above, not all issues in all
cases will be discussed and this should not be taken as an indication of lack of significance of
any particular issue with respect to such case and the parties involved.
1. Tariff Scbeduk Related Matters
There were three cases in particular that dealt with matters related to tariffs and schedules.
These were a panel decision in Japan-Measures Affecting Gmsumer Pbotograpbic Film and Paper'
1. Japan Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, Report of the Panel, WT/DS44/R
(Mar. 31, 1998) <http://www.wto.org>.
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qapan Film), which was not appealed, and two panel/Appellate Body decisions in Argentina-
Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiks, Apparel and Other Items2 (Argentina Footwear),
and European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment (EC LAN).
In Japan Film, the panel adopted a fairly broad interpretation of what constituted government
measures, showing a willingness to go beyond actual laws to include as measures uncodified
expressions of government policy. However, the panel found that the United States did not
have reasonable expectations that such measures would not be taken because such measures
were already in existence or the United States could have reasonably anticipated them at the
time of the tariff negotiations. The panel found that because most of the market structures
complained about were pre-existing, the measures individually or collectively could not have
"upset the competitive relationship" of imported and domestic film and paper.
In Argentina Footwear, the panel found that prevailing General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATI) and WTO practice had been that the form of a tariff had to correspond to
that agreed to in the bindings. In this case, Argentina had negotiated an ad valorem tariff
binding, but had applied a system of specific duties. The Appellate Body overruled the panel's
finding and found that there was no established GATT practice in this regard. The Appellate
Body found that there was no obligation on Argentina under Article H to apply a particular
form of duty as long as the rate did not exceed the negotiated ad valorem rate.
In EC LAN, the panel found that the United States had certain "legitimate expectations"
in the customs dassification of local area networking equipment. The United States argued
that such equipment had been treated as computer equipment (automatic data-processing ma-
chines), but then had been reclassified after the negotiation as audio visual equipment thereby
being subject to a higher duty. The Appellate Body followed its decision in India Patents (see
below) that the concept of legitimate expectations in GATT violation cases was not valid. The
Appellate Body decided that such a standard was a subjective standard and the Appellate Body
found that the appropriate standard was an "objective" standard of what both parties intended
by a negotiation. Accordingly, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that the European
Communities had violated Article 11. 1.
2. TRIPS
In the case of India-Patent Protection for Pbarmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products4
(India Patents), the panel found that the United States had certain "legitimate expectations"
in the interpretation of the meaning of Articles 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIP Agreement. Under
those provisions, the panel determined that India was obligated to set up a "mailbox" system
to preserve the novelty and priority of patents. The panel found India's ad hoc system insufficient
for these purposes. The panel also found that India had not provided for exclusive marketing
rights as required.
The Appellate Body rejected the panel's basis of "protection of legitimate expectations" for
its findings. The Appellate Body considered this an impermissible melding of the concepts of
expectations of equal competitive conditions, which applies in violation cases under Article
2. Argentina Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel, and Other Items, Report of the
Panel, WT/DS56/R (Nov. 2Y, 1997) <http://www.wto.org>.
3. European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, Report of the Panel,
WT/DS62/R, WTIDS67/R, WT/DS68/R (Feb. 5, 1998) <http://www.wto.org>.
4. India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Report of the Panel,
WT/DS50/R (Sept. 9, 1997) <http:www.wto.org>.
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XXIII: 1(a) of the GATT, and reasonable expectations of negotiating members, which applies
in non-violation cases under Article XXIII: 1(b) of the GATT. The Appellate Body noted that
the TRIP Agreement specifically does not allow for Article XXIII: 1 (b) complaints. The Appellate
Body agreed with the conclusions of the panel that India had not fulfilled its obligations under
Articles 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIP Agreement based on an interpretation of the object and
purpose of the TRIP Agreement itself.
3. Sanitary and Pbytosanitay Matters B
In 1997 the panel in European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones),' found that the E.C. ban on the importation of meat and meat products from
livestock treated with certain growth hormones was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 5.1,
and 5.5 of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS Agreement). The
panel found that the European Communities had not conducted a proper "risk assessment"
and therefore had not satisfied the requirements of Article 5. 1. The panel also found that
the European Communities had not based the restrictions on existing international standards
and therefore was not consistent with Article 3.1 and was not within the exception of
Article 3.3. The panel also found that the European Communities adopted arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions in levels of sanitary protection in different situations, which resulted
in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade and therefore was inconsis-
tent with Article 5.5.
The Appellate Body agreed that the E.C. measures were not "based on" a risk assessment,
noting that there had to be a rational or objective relationship between the measure and the
risk assessment. The Appellate Body further noted that such risk assessments could take into
consideration risks resulting from, for example, implementation problems outside the laboratory.
With respect to Article 3.1, the Appellate Body rejected the pand's finding that the language
in Article 3.1 that required use of international standards when available "except as otherwise
provided for in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3," in fact created a "general
rule-exception" relationship between the two paragraphs. In the Appellate Body's view, once
the European Communities invoked Article 3.3, Article 3.1 essentially became irrelevant.
The Appellate Body also reversed the panel's findings with respect to Article 5.5. In the
Appellate Body's view, all but one of the differences in treatment cited by the panel were not,
in fact, arbitrary or unjustifiable. With respect to artificial hormones and naturally occurring
hormones in other products, including meats and some vegetables such as broccoli, the Appellate
Body stated that there was a significant distinction because one was natural and the other
artificial. They then continued by noting that to require equal regulation of naturally occurring
hormones would be an enormous regulatory burden, although the question at issue appeared
to be less one of requiring further regulation of natural hormones than adjusting the regulation
of artificial hormones to accord with what is done for the naturally occurring ones.
In the other allegedly discriminatory situation, which involved non-hormonal treatments on
piglets, the Appellate Body found that the difference in the level of protection did not result
in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. The Appellate Body found
that the comparison of the no residue limits for hormones and the unlimited residue standards
5. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)-Complaint by the United States, Report
of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) <http://www.wto.org>; EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones)-Complaint by Canada, Report of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997)
<http://www.wto.org>.
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for these products was only an indicator of discrimination which it disregarded in light of the
policy justifications offered by the European Communities.
In the case of Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon6 (Australia Salmon), the
Appellate Body pursued an analysis under Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement by comparing
the treatment of salmon from Canada with Australia's treatment of other fish and fish products
such as herring used as bait and live ornamental fish. The Appellate Body found that the
differing treatment between such products satisfied all three steps of the analysis under Article
5.5. There was no in-depth discussion of the distinction between this case and the Appellate
Body findings in EC Hormones.
4. Article III Matters
In Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry7 (Indonesia Cars), the panel
found that exemption and reduction of certain sales taxes under the Indonesian National Car
Program violated Article 111:2. Also, the panel found that the local content requirements violated
the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement) and that customs
duty and sales tax benefits favoring certain imported cars was inconsistent with Article I of
the GATT. Significandy, the panel rejected Indonesia's argument that a case involving a subsidy
as defined in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures could only be reviewed
under that agreement and not under Article III. The panel also reaffirmed that to be exempt
from the requirements of Article III under the provisions of Article III:8(b), there must be a
direct payment from the government to the domestic producer of the product in question.
This decision was not appealed.
In Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,' the panel found that Korea's Liquor Tax Law violated
Article 111:2, second sentence, by providing dissimilar taxation between directly competitive
or substitutable imported and domestic products in a manner so as to afford protection to
domestic production. In reaching this conclusion, the panel found, among other things, that
Article 111:2, second sentence, includes potential competition as well as current competition.
It found that this was implicit in the treaty language and inherent in the concept of protecting
equal competitive opportunities. The panel also decided that the definition of directly competitive
or substitutable products under Article III was not the same as, and generally broader than,
the market definitions used in antitrust and competition laws. The Appellate Body, in a report
dated January 18, 1999, upheld the panel on all counts in the appeal. Among other things,
the Appellate Body specifically reaffirmed the appellate standard of review with respect to
factual issues that it announced in the EC Hormones case. The Appellate Body found that the
panel in the Korea Alcoholic Beverages case had not distorted, misrepresented or disregarded
evidence nor applied a "doubled standard" of proof in the case.
5. Artick XX Matters
In the case of United States-Import Probibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products9 (United
States Sbrimp/Turt), the Appellate Body generally redesigned its approach to Article XX cases.
6. Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Report of the Panel, WT/DS18/R (Dec. 6,1998)
<http://www.wto.org>.
7. Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, Report of the Pand, WT/DS54/R,
WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998) < http://www.wto.org>.
8. Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Pand, WT/DS75/R, WT/DS84/R (Sept. 17,1998)
<http://www.wto.org>.
9. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (May 15, 1998) < http://www.wto.org>.
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While agreeing with the panel's overall conclusion that the U.S. import prohibition on certain
shrimp from countries that did not implement appropriate sea turtle conservation policies was
inconsistent with Article XI and not justifiable under the exceptions of Article XX, the Appellate
Body reversed and modified much of the reasoning used by the panel.
The panel had decided the case based on an analysis of the chapeau of Article XX and, having
found that the U.S. unilateral import bans were discriminatory and disguised restrictions on inter-
national trade, did not proceed to the individual paragraphs ofArticle XX. However, the Appellate
Body decided that it was necessary to assess the measures in regard to paragraphs (a) through (J)
of Article XX before proceeding to an analysis under the chapeau. The Appellate Body also noted
that measures complying with the listed paragraphs may have a certain amount of unilateralism
inherent in them. The Appellate Body decided that protecting sea turtles was appropriately done
within the context of Article XX(g); that is, sea turtles could be considered an exhaustible natural
resource and the U.S. measures satisfied the requirements of paragraph (g).
In analyzing the U.S. measures with respect to the requirements of the chapeau, the Appellate
Body rejected the panel's finding that such measures were inconsistent because they imposed
policy restrictions unilaterally on the domestic policies of other members (i.e., policies not
related to the exported products themselves) and that such measures were a "threat to the
multilateral system." The panel had reasoned that if several members imposed such measures
and the measures were inconsistent, then international trade could effectively be shut down
because the exporter could not simultaneously comply with all the measures. The Appellate
Body determined that this standard applied by the panel was not adequately based on the text
of Article XX and rejected the panel's reference to the preamble of the GATT for interpretive
guidance. (However, the Appellate Body did find it relevant in its analysis of paragraph (g) to
refer to the preamble of the WTO Agreement. No further guidance was provided on the
distinction.)
The Appellate Body found that the U.S. measure was an unjustifiable discrimination because
of the requirement that members adopt essentially the same program as implemented by the
United States rather than merely a comparable one. Furthermore, the U.S. measures prohibited
imports of shrimp caught by uncertified countries even though their methods for catching the
actual imported shrimp might be identical to methods used for imports from certified countries.
The Appellate Body also cited the failure of the United States to engage the appellees in serious
across-the-board negotiations on sea turtle preservation. Finally, the Appellate Body noted that
the United States had negotiated agreements with other members than the appellees. The
Appellate Body stated that the "resulting unilateralism" of the U.S. actions supported their
conclusions. The Appellate Body did not provide further explanation of the link between this
conclusion and their earlier statement that there is some degree of unilateralism inherent in
measures falling within the subparagraphs of Article XX.
6. Procedural Matters
There were several important procedural matters dealt with by panels and the Appellate
Body in 1998. In India Patents, the Appellate Body determined that the panel had erred in
considering the claims raised by the United States under Article 63 of the TRIP Agreement.
The United States did not mention Article 63 in its request for a panel. The United States
referred to the TRIP Agreement as a whole and stated that its claims included but were not
limited to several other specified provisions. The Appellate Body found this reference too vague.
The Appellate Body also did not accept the panel's statement that it intended to rule on all
legal claims identified by the end of the first substantive meeting and that neither party objected.
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According to the Appellate Body, it was beyond the competence of the panel to consider
anything outside the terms of reference regardless of the positions of the parties. The Appellate
Body rejected the U.S. argument that it was forced into making the claim when it did because
India had not informed the United States during the course of the consultations of the "adminis-
trative instructions," which constituted the reason for the Article 63 claim. The Appellate
Body stated that based on a strict reading of the treaty text, there is simply no basis for altering
or adding to the terms of reference regardless of the circumstances.
In the case of United States Shrimp/Turtle, the panel had rejected several papers submitted
by non-governmental organizations. Instead, the panel provided an opportunity for the parties
to append any such papers to their own submissions and provided additional time for the other
parties to comment. The Appellate Body reversed the panel on the basis that the panel's
interpretation of the treaty text was too formal and technical in nature. In the Appellate Body's
view, the term "seek" in Article 13 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) gave
panels the authority to receive unrequested submissions from individuals or persons other than
member governments party to the dispute.
In Guatemala-Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico'" (Guate-
mala Cement) the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding in favor of the complainant on
the grounds that there was no proper jurisdiction to hear the dispute. First, the Appellate Body
overruled the panel's decision that Article 17 of the Antidumping Agreement provides for a
coherent set of rules for dispute settlement specific to anti-dumping cases that replaces the more
general approach of the DSU. Second, the Appellate Body found that Mexico had not initiated
the case on one of the three listed bases identified in Article 17.4 of the Anti-DumpingAgreement;
that is, the Mexican complaint was not with respect to a definitive anti-dumping duty, the
acceptance of a price undertaking, or a provisional measure. Thus, there was no authority for
the panel to proceed with the case.
B. ImpL.EmENTATION
The last half of the year was dominated by a dispute between the United States and its
co-complainants against the European Communities (supported by the banana producers covered
by the Lome Convention waiver) over the implementation by the European Communities of
the decision in European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas." An increasingly bitter disagreement arose as to the proper interpretation of Articles
21 and 22 of the DSU. In the view of the European Communities, Article 21.5 was the
exclusive remedy if there were disagreements on the consistency of implementing measures
with the member's obligations. Only if such an inconsistency were found could another party
proceed to Article 22 for compensation or the suspension of concessions. Furthermore, the
reference in Article 21.5 to "these dispute settlement procedures," in the E.C.'s view, means
that all of the procedures including consultations, panel requests, establishment of the panel
by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), and resort to the panel and Appellate Body were
included.
The United States argued that this was an overly expansive reading of the ambiguous terms
of Article 21.5. Such a reading, according to the United States, could lead to an endless loop
10. Guatemala-Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement From Mexico, AB-1998-6, Report
of the Appellate Body, WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2,1998) <http://www.wto.org>. See discussion infra Past IH.F.
11. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by
the United States, Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997) <http://www.wto.org>.
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of litigation over conformity of measures, leaving complainants as frustrated as under the
previous GATT system. Furthermore, nothing in Article 22 required recourse to Article 21.5
as a prerequisite. Finally, in the U.S. view, the E.C. interpretation would preclude ever resorting
to Article 22 because of that provision's required time limits.
In a DSB meeting concluded on January 29, 1999, the United States requested authority
to suspend concessions under Article 22.2. After considerable disagreement over procedural
issues, the DSB proceeded to consider the matter under reverse consensus procedures. However,
authorization to suspend concessions was not granted because the European Communities
requested that the issue be referred to arbitration in accordance with Article 22.6.
In another case, Canada-Measures Concerning Pe iodicah," there was a potential for the
beginning of a somewhat different version of the implementation issue. In this case, Canada
eliminated the offending measures within the "reasonable period of time" but indicated that
new measures affecting advertising in periodicals would be implemented. The potential question
is whether any such measures would be properly considered under Article 21.5 and Article
22 or should be considered as wholly new measures requiring review under the DSU ab initio.
III. Unfair Trade Laws at the International Trade Administration
A. THE STEEL WARS
Administrative litigation of unfair trade cases more than doubled in 1998 over 1997, with
forty-seven antidumping and countervailing duty investigations initiated by the Department of
Commerce (DOC) in 1998, compared with only twenty-one investigations initiated in 1997.
Of these forty-seven cases, roughly two-thirds involved steel products. All in all, 1998 saw
unfair trade actions being brought against four categories of steel products: stainless steel round
wire; stainless steel plate in coils; stainless steel sheet and strip-in coils; and hot-rolled, flat-rolled
carbon-quality steel.
The 1998 onslaught of steel investigations has raised a number of interesting issues for the
DOC to resolve. For example, in the steel antidumping investigations involving Korea, the
DOC must address the issue of currency conversion in light of the drop in the value of the
won." In the countervailing duty cases involving Korea, the DOC is again examining the
Korean banking system. In the 1993 Steel Products from Korea final determination, the DOC
found that the Korean government directed low cost loans to the steel industry over the years
1983 through 1991.14 In the 1998 investigations, petitioners alleged that the Korean government
continued to control the practices of lending institutions in Korea from 1992 onward and that
the steel sector received a disproportionate share of low-cost, long-term credit, thereby providing
the steel sector with a countervailable benefit."5
12. Canada-Measures Concerning Periodicals, Report of the Panel, WT/DS3 I/R (Mar. 14,1997) <http://
www.wto.org>.
13. Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip
in Coils From South Korea, 64 Fed. Reg. 137 (1999); Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less
Than Fair Value: Stainless Steel Plate in Coils (SSPQ From the Republic of Korea, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,535 (1998).
14. Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations and Final Negative Critical Circumstances Determi-
nations: Certain Steel Products From Korea, 58 Fed. Reg. 37.38 (1993).
15. Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty
Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination: Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from the
Republic of Korea, 63 Fed. Reg. 63,884 (1998); Preliminary Negative Countervailing Duty Determination and
Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination: Stainless
Steel Plate in Coils From the Republic of Korea, 63 Fed. Reg. 47,253 (1998).
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The hot-rolled steel cases, which were initiated in mid-October, were brought amidst much
concern by the U.S. steel producers that a sharp increase in imports from Japan and Russia,
among others, were causing them significant injury. Following initiation of the investigations
ofJapan, Russia, and Brazil, the DOC announced that it would expedite its preliminary investiga-
tions, issuing preliminary determinations several weeks earlier than the unextended deadline
provided for in the statute. In addition, on November 23, 1998, the DOC issued a preliminary
finding of critical circumstances with respect to Russia and Japan.16 This finding made it dear,
well ahead of the preliminary determinations, that if the preliminary determinations were
affirmative, importers could be liable retroactively for antidumping duties on entries made up
to ninety days prior to the DOC's preliminary determination.
When it came to the hot-rolled steel cases, the novel issues expanded beyond the DOC's
antidumping investigations. In October 1998, Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corporation com-
menced a civil action in the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas against producers and
trading companies of Russian and Japanese steel. The suit alleged state law claims of unfair
competition and tortious interference based on sales by the Russian and Japanese producers and
trading companies at prices below the cost of production and delivery, and Wheeling-Pittsburgh
sought a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief. The suit was removed to federal
court in the Southern District of Ohio, and the state law daims were dismissed based on the
court's finding that the matters raised were within the exclusive domain of federal law. 7
Wheeling-Pittsburgh subsequently refiled its complaint alleging federal claims under the Anti-
dumping Act of 1916. As of this writing, the case remains pending.
B. THE TRADE AND CoMPETITION ISSUE
The controversial trade and competition debate continued in 1998. On one side are countries
that want to focus on removing anticompetitive-practices that block market access for foreign
goods; on the other side are those that want to use competition policy as a vehicle for attacking
trade remedies, such as the antidumping laws. This debate took place in various fora, including
the WTO, the OECD, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and FTAA
discussions. The center of the debate was in the WTO Working Group on the Interaction
Between Trade and Competition Policy (Working Group).
The WTO Working Group studied a variety of market access issues in 1998, including the
impact of anticompetitive practices of enterprises and associations on international trade, the
impact of state monopolies, exclusive rights and regulatory policies on competition and interna-
tional trade, the relationship between the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
and competition policy, and the relationship between investment and competition policy. At
one meeting, the Working Group also addressed the "impact of trade policy on competition,"
a topic which allowed WTO members to discuss trade remedies. The members principally
raising challenges to trade remedies, with a definite focus on the "anti-competitive" nature of the
antidumping rules, were Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Hong Kong. The United States, meanwhile,
mounted a spirited defense of the antidumping rules. In some detail, the United States explained
that the fundamental flaw with competition policy's arguments against the antidumping rules
is the underlying premise that the antidumping rules have (or should have) the same objectives
16. Preliminary Determinations of Critical Circumstances: Certain Hot-Roled Flat-Roled Carbon-Quality
Steel Products From Japan and the Russian Federation, 63 Fed. Reg. 65,750 (1998).
17. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., No. C2-98-1122, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18235 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 16, 1998).
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as the antitrust laws. According to the United States, the antidumping rules and the antitrust
laws have different objectives and are founded on different principles, and they seek to remedy
different problems. If the antidumping rules were eliminated in favor of the antitrust laws or
modified to be consistent with antitrust principles, the United States pointed out, the problems
that the antidumping rules seek to remedy would go unaddressed.
18
The WTO Working Group tentatively had been scheduled to expire at the end of 1998,
but its work was extended for the first six months of 1999. The 1999 agenda includes the
relevance of fundamental WTO principles of national treatment, transparency, and MFN
treatment to competition policy, approaches to promoting cooperation and communication
among WTO members, induding in the field of technical cooperation, and the contribution
of competition policy to achieving the objectives of the WTO; it does not indude the antidump-
ing topic.
C. NEW COUNTERVAILING DUTY REGULATIONS AND THE PRIVATIZATION ISSUE IN COURT
Capped by two decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the courts
decisively confirmed that the methodology used by the DOC since 1993 to determine whether
merchandise produced by companies that have been sold by their government continues to
benefit from subsidies received prior to the sale is consistent with congressional intent. Even
as the court was approving its present methodology, the DOC conduded a four-year dialogue
with representatives of domestic and foreign companies and governments by issuing final counter-
vailing duty regulations that were silent on the privatization issue."
The DOC continued in 1998 to confront issues regarding whether the privatization (or change
in ownership) of a company affects the countervailability of previously bestowed subsidies. In
September, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the DOC's privatization
methodology in a case involving lead and bismuth steel products from the United Kingdom.20
Inland Steel Bar Co. v. United States involved the sale by British Steel Corporation of a productive
unit to which DOC had allocated a portion of the subsidies previously received by British
Steel. The U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) held that unless the productive unit were
a legal entity, which the DOC determined it was not, it was not capable of receiving a subsidy,
and thus past subsidies did not travel with it when it was sold.' On appeal, the Federal Circuit
reversed the CIT and affirmed the DOC's determination that a privatized productive unit was
capable of receiving subsidies that continued to be countervailable. In its opinion, the Federal
Circuit reiterated its 1996 holding that " 'commerce's [privatization] approach was reasonable
and should not have been disturbed.' "" And, in the flat-rolled steel cases on remand from
the Federal Circuit, the CIT affirmed that the DOC had properly applied its privatization
methodology for allocating subsidies between the buyer and seller when a state-owned company
is privatized. 2
During the steel investigations, the DOC only confronted situations involving the sale of
state-owned companies to private entities. However, in the 1996 countervailing duty investiga-
18. See Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication From
the United States,WT/WGTCP/W/88 (Aug. 28,1998) <http://www.wto.org>.
19. Countervailing Duties, 19 C.F.R. § 351 (1998).
20. Inland Steel Bar Co. v. United States, 155 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
21. Inland Steel Bar Co. v. United States, 960 F. Supp. 307 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997).
22. Inland Steel Bar, 155 F.3d at 1375 (quoting Saarstahl AG v. United States, 78 F.3d 1539, 1544 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)).
23. British Steel PLC v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 2d 209 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998).
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tion of pasta from Italy, the DOC addressed for the first time a situation concerning the sale
of a privately-owned company to a private buyer. In addition, because this investigation was
subject to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), the DOC was required to apply the
new "change in ownership" provision of the URAA.24 In so doing, the DOC used the same
privatization methodology it had used in the 1993 steel cases to allocate subsidies in the pasta
case between the private buyer and the private seller. While the CIT was initially skeptical of
using this approach in a private-to-private sale, it subsequently affirmed on remand DOC's
methodology after the DOC provided a further explanation of why the privatization methodol-
ogy it had used for public sales was applicable under the URAA to a private-to-private change
in ownership.
2 5
Acceptance by the Court of Appeals of the DOC privatization methodology came even as
the agency was considering a range of ways to modify that approach, including circumstances
under which prior subsidies would no longer be attributed to merchandise produced by the
company. In the end, the DOC kept open its options, thus ensuring that any change to the
privatization methodology would be made in the context of actual cases, and that the present
approach, in which the purchase price is taken to reduce unamortized previous subsidies in
part, would be applied until that time. It explained that while it had developed some expertise
on this issue during the past five years, more time was needed to assess the appropriateness
of its current methodology as new privatization scenarios were encountered and to determine
whether an alternative analytical framework could be developed to address these situations.
' 6
The new regulations, the first substantive regulatory guidance in the subsidies area from the
agency, 2 make significant changes to the DOC practice in other areas. For example, the DOC
decided that equity infusions by governments into unhealthy2" companies would be treated as
a grant in the full amount of the equity infusion, 9 thereby abandoning attempts in the proposed
regulations to construct a hypothetical price that would have been paid for the shares by a
reasonable private investor or to adjust the subsidy amount for a particular period by the
amount of actual returns to investors.3°
Another important provision posits a normative definition of "benefit," one of three prerequi-
sites to the finding of a subsidy (along with two factors already defined in the Subsidies Agreement
and the law-a "financial contribution" from the government that is "specific" to an industry
or firm). Under the new definition, a "benefit" exists where the company pays less for its
inputs (e.g., moneys, a good, or a service) than it otherwise would pay in the absence of the
government program, or receives more revenues than it otherwise would earn.31 Although the
agency was careful to advise that this general rule would not overtake the more specific descrip-
tions of a benefit contained in the rules governing particular subsidies, such as loans or equity
24. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5XF).
25. Delverde, SrL v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 314 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998).
26. 63 Fed. Reg. 65,348,355 (1998).
27. The department proposed substantive regulations a decade ago in Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Request for Public Comments (Countervailing Duties), 54 Fed. Reg. 23,366(1989), but they were not made final
because of Uruguay Round negotiations that resulted in revision ofthe Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures.
28. The technical term invented by the department is "unequityworthy," defined in 19 C.F.R. § 351.507(aX4)
as a firm unable to generate a reasonable rate of return within a reasonable period of time. 63 Fed. Reg. 65,410
(1998).
29. 19 C.F.R. § 351.507(aX6), 63 Fed. Reg. 65,411 (1998).
30. See 63 Fed. Reg. 65,374 (1998).
31. 19 C.F.R. § 351.503(b), 63 Fed. Reg. 65,408 (1998).
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infusions, and also cautioned that a benefit still might be found even if the definition were not
met if the program was similar to illustrative subsidies set out in the statute, this new attempt
to provide a reasoned framework to guide practitioners of subsidy law will no doubt create
controversy in dose cases.
When a firm receives a government loan, the DOC normally calculates whether a subsidy
has been provided by comparing what the firm pays for the government loan with the amount
it would pay for a comparable commercial loan the company actually could obtain on the
market. If the DOC determines that the firm could not have obtained long-term loans from
commercial sources, the agency has long added a premium to account for the additional risk
of default being taken on by the government. The new regulations significantly increase this
premium by specifying that the benchmark for an uncreditworthy company will be the average
default rate reported by Moody's Investor Service for speculative-grade corporate bonds (those
rated Caa to Q. ' The DOC explains that data from corporate bond issuers in the country
under investigation is unavailable and that the new risk premium will more accurately reflect
the added exposure to default substantially.
The Asian economic crisis focused attention on the transnational subsidy exception, which
has long provided that subsidies by one country to companies in another country, or by
international lending and development agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF, are not
actionable under U.S. countervailing duty law." In order to forestall arguments that the existence
of funds from major bailout packages from the IMF somehow shielded countries, such as
Korea, that in the past had been found to subsidize their key export industries, the DOC
clarified in the new rules that the transnational subsidy exemption would continue to apply
if the funding for the subsidy is supplied "in accordance with, and as part of," a program or
project funded by another government or an international lending or development institution.'
In short, dams and hydroelectric plants that are the stuff of international development programs
continue to enjoy exemption from the countervailing duty statute, but countries should not
attempt to shield programs that otherwise would meet the criteria for countervailable subsidies
on the grounds that the money for the subsidy can be traced to funds given by an international
organization. "
In order to reflect the impact over time of non-recurring benefits, such as a large one-time
grant, the DOC has for the past several years allocated such subsidies over the average useful
life of physical assets for the recipient firm. The new regulations continue this practice, but
with a twist. Under the recent rule, the DOC has created a presumption that the average useful
life in question is that of the industry concerned as reflected in asset depreciation tables of the
U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 6 The company in question can rebut this presumption
by showing that the average useful life of its physical assets is different by one or more years.
The purpose of the presumption is to reduce the burden on all parties of gathering complex
data when the ultimate result is often substantially the same as readily-available data from the
IRS tables.
32. 19 C.F.R. § 35l.505(aX3Xiii), 63 Fed. Reg. 65,408 (1998).
33. North Star Steel Ohio v. United States, 824 F. Supp. 1074 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993).
34. 19 C.F.R. § 351.527, 63 Fed. Reg. 65,417 (1998).
35. See 63 Fed. Reg. 65,405 (1998).
36. 19 C.F.R. § 351.524(cX2), 63 Fed. Reg. 65,416 (1998).
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D. DmNSE OF U.S. ExPoRTERS IN FoREiGN TRADE REmEDY INVESTIGATIONS
In the 1970s and 1980s, the four countries with the largest and most open markets-the
United States, Europe, Canada, and Australia-were the most active users of trade remedy
laws. That story is changing rapidly. Although these four countries have by no means trimmed
their caseloads, other countries have assumed the role of major users of these laws.
Today some fifty-five countries have antidumping laws on the books, and in 1997, the year
in which this trend became manifest, twenty-three of these countries carried out 200 antidumping













As the chart37 shows, while the traditional users of the trade remedy laws continue to use
them, the new users have begun to conduct a substantial number of investigations. For example,
note that India, Brazil, and Argentina conducted almost as many cases in 1997 as the top three
(Europe, Australia, and the United States), and they were followed closely by Korea and South
Africa. Even Indonesia has become a significant player on this scene. Based on partial 1998
data, Mexico can be counted in the top echelon of countries using the trade remedy laws, and
the Asian economic crisis has ensured that Brazil and Argentina in particular will remain in
this dass for last year as well.
These results should not surprise us, once we consider the major strides these countries have
made in recent years to open their markets. When a country has high tariffs, licensing systems,
37. Data are taken from the 1997 Report of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/204 (Nov.
6, 1997), and cover the last six months of 1996 and the first six months of 1997.
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and unfriendly distribution networks, it does not need trade remedy laws to protect its industries
from unfairly-traded imports. Without those trade barriers, however, the trade remedy laws
become the only legitimate tools to address the injury caused by unfair trading practices.
This trend continued in 1998. Fifty-nine countries had enacted antidumping laws, and
twenty-one of them started 2 35 investigations.38 While the traditional antidumping activists
increased the number of cases initiated over 1997 (117 versus 78), the new enthusiasts of trade
remedies maintained dose positions immediately behind the leaders. Perhaps the most striking
change from 1997 was by South Africa, which initiated twenty-three cases in 1998, twice as
many as Canada, India, Brazil, and Indonesia, and almost as many as the United States.3
As newcomers to trade remedies opened investigations, the United States, through the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR), the DOC, 4° and the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC),
increased its interventions in overseas actions in order to ensure that U.S. exporters received
the benefit of the transparency and detailed rules negotiated during the Uruguay Round. A
major foreign antidumping action against U.S. exporters that engaged the resources of ITA in
1998 (as well as those of the U.S. International Trade Commission and the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative) was Mexico's investigation of high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS). Initiated
in February 1997 by the Mexican Commerce Department (SECOFI), the investigation resulted
in large antidumping duties assessed against U.S. exporters by the end of January 1998. The
U.S. industry is pursuing its private remedies against SECOFI under the binational panel
procedure of Chapter 19 of NAFTA; that case is ongoing. Meanwhile, the U.S. government
requested and held consultations with the Mexican government twice, on October 8, 1997,
and again on June 12, 1998, under the auspices of the WTO. 41 Since the consultations did
not result in resolution of the matter, a WTO panel is being formed and the case will proceed
in 1999. The major issue in the WTO case is SECOFI's initiation of an antidumping proceeding
on HFCS, when the petitioner was the Mexican sugar industry. Other issues concern weaknesses
in SECOFI's threat of material injury finding, the length of time for which it imposed provisional
measures, and certain technical and procedural matters.
DOC officials also were involved in other foreign trade remedy investigations in 1998. For
example, the European Union conducted antidumping investigations involving polysulphide
polymers and large aluminum electrolytic capacitors from the United States. The U.S. industries
met with officials from the DOC and USTR regarding the issues arising in each of those cases
and the agencies conferred with the European Union regarding the WTO consistency of these
investigations. The investigation of polysulphide polymers was completed in September 1998
and, as of this writing, the European Union is completing the investigation of capacitors.
38. 1998 Report of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, G/L/268 (Nov. 5, 1998).
39. Id. A note as to Mexico is in order. Although Mexico initiated relatively fewer cases in the past two
years than in prior years, Mexico ranks fifth in antidumping usage in the ten years ending in 1997 and dearly
is among the new enthusiasts of trade remedies. See Jorge Miranda et al., The International Use of Antidumping:
1987-1997, 5J. WoRaw TRADE 32, 65 (1998).
40. Import Administration posts on its Web site a listing of foreign trade cases against U.S. firms together
with information on how companies may receive U.S. government assistance. See Monitoring Foreign Antidumping
and Counemai/ing Duty Case (visited Feb. 22, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/import.admin/records/foradcvd/
index.html >.
41. The consultations were held pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakish Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2, LEGAL INS UMENTS-RsULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND; 33 I.L.M.
1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU] and Article 17.3 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Taiffs and Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, supra, Annex IA [hereinafter Antidumping Agreement].
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Also in 1998, China (MOFTEC) conducted its first antidumping investigation against United
States, as well as Canadian and South Korean, newsprint exporters. While not a member
of the WTO, China made some effort to follow WTO procedures. It issued a preliminary
determination in July 1998, imposing a substantial (seventy-nine percent) antidumping duty
on U.S. companies and margins ranging to that level on Canadian and Korean companies.
The DOC has provided advice to U.S. exporters concerning useful approaches to Chinese
antidumping authorities. MOFTEC has not yet issued a final determination.
Finally, SECOFI has also been active in initiating antidumping cases against U.S. exporters
of cattle, beef, and swine, and in taking other antidumping actions affecting U.S. companies.
In October it initiated cases against U.S. beef and live cattle; there has been discussion about
the possible deletion of cattle from the case. Meanwhile, an antidumping case initiated on
October 21, 1998, against U.S. exports of live swine is ongoing. Also in October SECOFI
issued a final antidumping determination against U.S. cut bond paper, with margins ranging
from five percent to eighteen percent. Likewise in 1998, Mexico expanded its "reference price"
system on import-sensitive products, whereby Mexico monitors import prices, allegedly to
combat under-invoicing. The system has occasioned complaints from exporters in various na-
tions, who are concerned that Mexico may use the information collected to initiate antidumping
actions.
E. CIRCUMVENTION OF TRADE ORDERS
In the area of anticircumvention, the DOC has continued to aggressively enforce the statutory
prohibition against circumventing orders through minor alterations of merchandise.42 The DOC
initiated two "minor alterations" proceedings arising from very similar allegations that foreign
producers were circumventing orders on steel products by adding trace amounts of the element
boron, so as to remove their products from the technical scope of the antidumping duty orders. 3
The outcome of these inquiries remains undear, however, because parties have challenged
before the CIT the DOC's authority to conduct such inquiries where the merchandise as altered
is not covered by the scope of the department's antidumping duty order.
In the most significant development in this area, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
in Wbeatland v. United States" upheld a prior ruling by the CIT that the DOC could not
conduct an anticircumvention inquiry where the merchandise in question was dearly excluded
from the scope of the antidumping duty order." The court reasoned that the "minor alterations"
provision allows the DOC to reach merchandise not within the "literal scope" of the antidumping
duty order, if the alteration was insignificant; however, it does not permit the DOC to include
merchandise which was "expressly and unambiguously" excluded from the scope. In Wbeatland,
the court based its holding that the DOC could not conduct an anticircumvention inquiry on
its finding that: (1) the product in question existed at the time the DOC conducted its initial
investigation and established the scope of the order; (2) the petitioner explicitly excluded the
product from the scope of the order; and (3) the ITC had explicitly excluded the product from
the like product subject to its original injury analysis.
42. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c) (1994).
43. See Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan; Initiation of Anticircumvention Inquiry
on Antidumping Duty Order, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,364 (1998); Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate From Canada;
Initiation of Anticircumvention Inquiry on Antidumping Duty Order, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,179 (1998).
44. Wheatland v. United States, No. 98-1102, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 29823 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
45. Wheatland v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 149 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997).
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In the litigation arising from the boron-steel inquiries, discussed above, plaintiffs cited the
Wbeatlanddecision to support their motions to enjoin the DOC's anticircumvention proceedings.
The DOC cited the same decision as support for its position that it had the legal authority to
conduct its proceedings. On December 16, 1998, the CIT issued an order preliminarily enjoining
the Canadian boron-steel inquiry, but with no rationale accompanying the order. The court
continued a temporary restraining order on the Japanese boron-steel inquiry. In addressing
these and future minor alterations cases, the CIT, and possibly the Court of Appeals, will have
to darify the distinction drawn in Wheat/and between situations in which the DOC may use
the minor alterations provision to address circumvention by products outside the scope of the
order, and situations in which it may not.
F. WTO DispUTE SrrLawmr PANELS
The 1998 year also saw the first antidumping cases move through the WTO's dispute
settlement system. In two cases, Anti-dumping Invesutigation Regarding Portland Cement From
Mexico and Anti-dumping Duty On Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiamduators (DRAMs)
Of One Megabit Or Above From Korea," important issues regarding the initiation of antidumping
investigations, the revocation of antidumping orders, and the jurisdiction of dispute settlement
panels were addressed.
Cementfom Mexico concerned the first antidumping investigation conducted by Guatemala's
Ministry of Economy.47 In submissions before the panel, Mexico argued that the initiation of
the investigation contravened various provisions contained in Artide 5 of the Agreement on
the Implementation of Artide VI of the GATT 1994 (AD Agreement). In particular, Mexico
maintained that Guatemala lacked sufficient evidence regarding dumping, injury, and causation
to justify the initiation of an antidumping proceeding. Guatemala sought to refute these allega-
tions. It also argued, with the support of the United States (as third party), that Mexico's claims
were not properly before the pand.48 According to Guatemala and the United States, a panel
may be established only to examine the WTO consistency of a particular measure (or measures)
identified in a request for consultations and in the request for establishment of a panel. In the
context of a dispute under the AD Agreement, they argued, a WTO member may challenge
any action as long as the claim relates to (and identifies) one of three measures: a final antidumping
determination, a price undertaking, or a preliminary determination having a significant impact.4"
Because the final antidumping determination was not identified in Mexico's request for consulta-
tion, there was no price undertaking, and Mexico had not argued (let alone shown) that the
preliminary determination had a significant impact, Guatemala and the United States maintained
that the panel lacked jurisdiction.
The panel's ruling was issued to the parties on May 7, 1998. In the ruling, the panel rejected
the views advanced by Guatemala and the United States. According to the panel, Article 17.4
of the AD Agreement does not limit the scope of dispute settlement to certain measures. Instead,
it merely provides for when a panel may be requested-that is, after a final or preliminary measure
has been taken, or after a price undertaking has been accepted.'0 Disputes in anti-dumping cases,
46. Because the pand's report was not made public during 1998, and is in any event subject to appeal, it
will be summarized in next year's review.
47. Guatemala-Anti-dumping Investigation RgardingPorland Cment From Mexo, WT/DS60/R para. 9.114-
230 (June 19, 1998) [hereinafter Cement From Mexico].
48. Seeid. paras. 4.0-.100.
49. See id. paras. 4.3 & 7.4 (citing 17.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement).
$0. See id. para. 7.10.
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the panel declared, may concern any "action taken, or not taken, during the course of the
investigation."'" According to the panel, "[t]his interpretation of the provisions of Article 17
provides for a coherent set of rules for dispute settlement specific to anti-dumping cases, taking
account of the peculiarities of challenges to anti-dumping investigations and determinations,
that replaces the more general approach of the DSU.""
In August, Guatemala notified the DSB, pursuant to Article 16.4 of the DSU, of its intention
to appeal various aspects of the panel's ruling. In written submissions Guatemala argued, with
the support of the United States, that the pand's so-called "replacement doctrine" (under which
the dispute settlement rules in Article 17 completely replace similar rules in the DSU) was
infirm. Guatemala and the United States insisted, for example, that Articles 4.4 (concerning
requests for consultations) and 6.2 (concerning requests for panels) of the DSU could be read
in harmony with Article 17 of the AD Agreement." Under this approach, every matter that
seeks to challenge the application of a member's antidumping regime must identify the measure
taken against it. If there is no measure (i.e., if there is no affirmative determination leading to
a measure), then there is no matter, at least none that may be the subject of consultations
under Artide 17.3 of the AD Agreement or of a panel request under Article 17.4.
The Appellate Body issued its report on November 2, 1998. 54 In a stunning victory for
Guatemala and the United States, the Appellate Body held that Mexico's case was never properly
before the panel. According to the Appellate Body, the pand's replacement theory ignored
the "integrated nature of the WTO dispute settlement system established by Article 1.1 of
the DSU."" Articles 4.4 and 6.2 of the DSU could be read, as Guatemala and the United
States had urged, in harmony with one another.56 The Appellate Body also held that the panel
had defined the term "measure" in the DSU too broadly, and had blurred the distinction
between a "measure" and a "claim."" According to the Appellate Body, every "matter"
referred to the DSB has two elements: "the specific measures at issue and the legal basis of the
51. Id. para. 7.16.
52. Id In other sections of its report, the panel also took issue with Guatemala's claim that evidence of
dumping, injury, and causal link in an antidumping petition is inherently "sufficient" under Article 5.3 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement if it constitutes all of the evidence "reasonably available" to the petitioner in accordance
with Article 5.2. See id paras. 7.49-.52 & 7.79. According to the panel, investigating authorities have two distinct
obligations under Article 5.2 and 5.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. First, under Article 5.2, authorities must
determine that a petition contains such information of dumping, injury, and causation as was "reasonably available"
to the petitioner. If, and only if, this condition is satisfied, authorities are required to determine under Article
5. 3 whether that evidence is sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation. While the panel did acknowledge
that the quantum and quality of evidence required at the time of initiation is less than that required at the time
of a preliminary or final determination, it also ruled that the type of evidence set forth in Article 2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement (e.g., evidence of normal value and export price) was a prerequisite to initiation. See
id. para. 7.64.
53. Guatenaw-Ati-umpingnvesoigation RegardingPorlandCement FromMexico, WIDS6O/AB/R, Report
of the Appellate Body circulated Nov. 2, 1998, paras. 5-7, 50-51 [hereinafter Appelate Body Report on Cement
From Mexico].
54. The members of the Appellate Body that heard Guatemala's appeal were Julio Lacarte-Muro (Presiding
Member), Christopher Beeby (Member), and Said EI-Naggar (Member).
55. Appellate Body Report on Cement From Mexico, supra note 53, para. 67.
56. In the opinion of the Appellate Body, the "special or additional" rules and provisions on dispute settlement
in a covered agreement (such as the Anti-Dumping Agreement) should only prevail over the comparable rules
in the DSU when "adherence to ... one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the
case of a conflict between them." Id para. 65 (emphasis in original).
57. See id. para. 69. The panel considered the use of the term "measure" to be a "shorthand reference to
the many and varied situations in which obligations under the WTO Agreements might not be fulfilled." Cementfrom Mexico, supra note 47, para. 7.26.
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complaint (or the claims)."58 While a "claim" may relate to any action that allegedly results in
the "nullification or impairment of benefits or the impeding of the achievement of any objective
in a dispute under the Anti-dumping Agreement,"" Article 17.4 makes dear that only three
measures may be referred to the DSB as part of the "matter" in dispute: a final antidumping
determination, a price undertaking, or a preliminary determination having a significant impact.6°
In the case before it, the Appellate Body held, Mexico had not identified any measure in its
request for a panel; instead, it had merely identified the initiation and subsequent conduct of
Guatemala's investigation. '
IV. U.S. International Trade Commission
The past year was not a highly active year for the ITC, at least if measured by the issuance
of decisions. Yet there were a number of notable events. The first was a court decision potentially
affecting the ITC's general methodology for causation findings, the second involved the issuance
of the final version of the ITC's sunset procedural regulations, and the third was the beginnings
of the processing of sunset reviews.
A. GERALD METALS
The most important court case in 1998 actually occurred in the last week of 1997, but was
not covered by last year's survey.62 On December 23, 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States.61 In the eighteen
years since the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, there have been precious few
CIT decisions affecting the operations of the ITC. The inherent latitude to consider the host
of factors listed in the statute gives to the ITC commissioners wide discretion to decide cases
as they wished, without much risk of the courts' criticizing (let alone overturning) the ITC's
decision.
The Gerald Metah decision is a marked departure from those earlier rulings and, because it
is a U.S. Court of Appeals' decision, promises to constrain the ITC's freedom in two respects.
The case resulted from the ITC's antidumping investigation of magnesium imports from Russia,
the Ukraine, and China. The ITC (on a three to three vote) had found material injury to the
U.S. industry by reason of imports from these countries. The DOC found that much of the
record highlighted information about imports from Russia, and much of those imports were
fairly traded." Those Russian or third country trading companies with zero or de minimis
calculated dumping margins had been excluded from the scope of the DOC's affirmative final
Less-Than-Fair-Value (LTFV) determination.
Gerald Metals argued that because the fairly-traded imports were substitutes for the LTFV
Russian imports, U.S. purchasers could meet their demand without relying on LTFV imports
58. Appellate Body Report on Cennt From Mexico, supra note 53, para. 72 (emphasis in original).
59. Id pars. 79.
60. See id.
61. See id. paras. 83-88. Having reversed the panel on jurisdictional grounds, the Appellate Body did not
find it necessary to consider the merits of Guatemala's arguments regarding the initiation and conduct of its
antidumping investigation. Set id. para. 89.
62. John F. Murphy, International Legal Dvelkolses in Retvew: 1998-Introduction, 32 INT'L LAW. 215,
319, 335-36 (1998).
63. See Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
64. See id. at 718.
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and without necessarily resorting to purchases from the U.S. industry."5 There was no evidence
that, in the absence of the LTFV sales, the U.S. products would have replaced the imported
products, or that the U.S. industry would have been able to raise its prices.
The CIT ruled against Gerald Metals, finding that the ITC had in fact considered the fairly
traded imports. They had been discussed at the ITC's hearing, and there had been subsequent
inquiries about them by certain commissioners."' Further, the ITC was not to weigh the various
causes of injury. It was sufficient for the ITC to find imports contributed "minimally" or
"even slight[ly]." 67
The court of appeals began its analysis by agreeing that the fairly traded Russian imports
and the unfairly traded Russian imports were perfect substitutes for each other, and the Russian
and Ukrainian imports were dose substitutes."' Then, unlike the CIT below, the court of
appeals concluded that the two Russian producers sold to fairly-trading importers almost as
often as to unfairly trading importers and that U.S. purchasers purchased from both groups
of importers in similar amounts. Absent more careful economic analysis of such purchasing
patterns, the court concluded that it could not uphold the CIT's finding of no evidence to
support Gerald Metals' proposition.69 The court therefore remanded the case back to the CIT
for further analysis.
More fundamentally, the court of appeals concluded that the CIT had been wrong to conclude
that "minimal" or "slight" contribution to material injury by the LTFV goods was enough
to satisfy the statutory "by reason of' causality requirement. The court interpreted the "by
reason of' phrase as requiring a showing of more than a minimal or tangential contribution
by the LTFV imports to the material injury of the U.S. industry. "[Die minimis (e.g. minimal
or tangential) causation of injury does not reach the causation level required under the statute."70
Upon remand, the ITC (on a 2 to 1 vote) found no material injury by reason of the imports,
and the CIT subsequently upheld the remand results."
The CIT in 1998 showed some interest in making the ITC conduct meaningful analysis
under the Federal Circuit's new standard. There have been three CIT decisions citing the
Federal Circuit's new standard. Two merely reference the new standard and then find that
the ITC's determination was supported by substantial evidence." In the third, NEC Corporation
d& HSNX Supercomputers, Inc. v. United States," the CIT did find in the record "significant
economic factors having a negative impact on the domestic industry that are entirely unrelated
65. See id. at 719.
66. Se Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 930, 935 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
67. See id. at 936 n.30.
68. See Gerald Metals, 132 F.3d at 720.
69. See id. at 721.
70. Id.
71. Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998), slip op. 98-148 (October
20, 1998). In a footnote, the CIT elaborated on its interpretation of the CAFC ruling, and the interplay of the
ruling with the legislative history instructing the ITC not to compare or contrast the effect from the LTFV imports
to the effects stemming from other factors. The CIT recognized that another event could have so significant an
effect as to make the LTFV harm insignificant, and at the same time emphasized that there could be more than
one material cause of the injury. See id. at 1355 n.7.
72. See Coalition for the Preservation of Am. Brake Drum & Rotor Aftermarket Mfrs v. United States, 15
F. Supp. 2d 918 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998); Goss Graphics Sys. Inc. v. United States, No. 96-10-02314, slip op.
98-147 (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 16, 1998). The Gos Graphics decision, however, was upholding a ITC negative
determination and therefore did not need to satisfy the Gerald Metals standard.
73. NEC Corp. & HSNX Supercomputers, Inc. v. Department of Commerce & U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
No. 98-164, 97-11-01967, slip op. 98-148 (Ct. Int'l Trade Dec. 15, 1998).
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to the subject imports." Because of the lack of any ITC analysis of these factors, the CIT could
not determine if the LTFV imports made a material contribution to the threat of injury. The
CIT also was not convinced that the ITC had adequately analyzed the relative importance of
price versus non-price considerations when it gave weight to aggressive import pricing as a
basis for finding a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices. The CIT
therefore remanded these issues back to the ITC for further investigation.'4
It remains to be seen whether the ITC's behavior will be significantly altered by the court
of appeal's decision. The ITC may choose to: (1) merely alter its boilerplate in its decisions;
(2) include in the narrative portion of its decisions case-specific analysis of fairly traded goods
and the materiality of the effect of LTFV goods on the U.S. industry; or (3) actually undertake
data analysis of the two issues. Because there were only four final determinations in 1998 that
even mentioned Gerald Metal, it is unclear whether the Federal Circuit's instructions will be
taken seriously or will be quickly watered down. It is unlikely that the first course would be
tolerated by the courts if a pattern of boiler repetition evolves. As for the second, narrative
discussion can easily deteriorate into writing around Gerald Metals, that is, adding case-specific
minimal discussion to show that the issues were considered.
Finally, there is the interesting methodological question of extending the principle of examin-
ing the impact of fairly traded goods. The court of appeals only dealt with the situation when
separate sellers were found to have traded fairly, but the same principle can apply to the fairly
traded sales by a seller who, on the basis of overall sales activity, is found to be trading
unfairly. The DOC calculates and reports to the ITC one weighted average dumping margin
but, consistent with the logic of Gerald Metah, one could argue for subdividing the seller's sales
into those that were fairly traded and those that were not. A relatively few sporadic giveaway
sales can create an overall weighted-average dumping margin. Analysis of the causal effect of
sporadic high margin sales would likely lead to different conclusions than presuming that all
of a seller's sales have dumping margins.
B. SuNsET REviEws
1. The ITC's Regulations
On June 5, 1998, the ITC issued its final procedural regulations for Section 751(c) sunset
reviews." The final regulations are notable for their retreat from the precise and inflexible
regulations proposed by the ITC on October 23, 1997.76 Under the proposed regulations:
1. Domestic producers and respondents would have had to submit substantial amounts of
information thirty days after the notice instituting the review whether or not the domestic
industry was interested in defending the continued existence of the order;"
2. The ITC proposal contained numerical guidelines, for cases involving multiple mem-
bers of the domestic industry and/or multiple foreign producers or exporters, to
determine whether the collection of responses was adequate. Responses from more
than fifty percent of the potential response group would be a strong indication of an
adequate response, while responses from less than twenty-five percent would be a
strong indication of an inadequate response.'" The proposal did not address what
74. See id. at 29-35.
75. Sec 63 Fed. Reg. 30,599 (1998).
76. See 62 Fed. Reg. 55,185 (1997).
77. See id. 55,193, 55,195.
78. See id. 55,190.
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would happen in cases involving multiple exporting countries when the exporters in
some countries were deemed responsive, while those in other countries were deemed
not responsive.
The final regulation dispensed with these and other contentious issues. In particular, the
ITC and the DOC established an initial screening mechanism, administered by the DOC, to
determine whether the domestic industry was interested in participating in a sunset review in
order to retain the order. Without such an initial expression of interest, an order would be
automatically revoked." The ITC also reduced the amount of empirical data that was to be
submitted with the initial response to institution of an ITC review. 0 The ITC kept the question
of asking parties whether they agreed with the domestic like product and domestic industry
definitions from the original investigation. This information is particularly useful in the first
reviews of old orders-where the product or industry might have changed in the years since
the order was issued. 8 As for the adequacy of individual responses, and how an inadequate
response could affect other companies, the final regulations backed off from any general rule,
preferring instead case-by-case decision-making.82
2. Early Rulings
Because the ITC's initial round of sunset reviews only began in July 1998, and because the
investigations take 150 days (expedited review) or 360 days (full reviews) to complete, 3 there
were no completed full reviews in 1998, and very few completed expedited reviews. Therefore
there is no meaningful information about the methodological approaches that the commissioners
are using in these reviews.
We do know that the no domestic interest initial screening by the DOC is resulting in
significant numbers of cases being revoked. Of the sixty-one orders eligible for review in the
first six months of this initial sunset cyde, thirty (49.2 percent of the total) have been revoked
due to no domestic industry interest:
Month of 1998 Total Orders Orders Under Orders Terminated
Eligible for Review Review for Lack of
Domestic Interest
July 8 1 7
August 7 5 2
September 8 2 6
October 14 8 6
November 13 1 1 2
December 1 1 4 1 7
Total 61 31 30
Source: ITC Website
79. See 63 Fed. Reg. 30,600-01 (1998).
80. See id. 30,601, 30,610.
81. See id. 30,602, 30,610.
82. See id. 30,602-04.
83. See id. 30,611.
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With regard to reviews underway, the ITC has been releasing voting sheets and synopses
of how the individual commissioners have voted on the adequacy of responses. In addition,
certain commissioners, specifically Commissioners Crawford, Bragg, and Koplan, have released
statements elaborating on particular votes. These statements have flagged certain issues:
1. In Roller Chain from Japan, a trade association filing a response on behalf of five of the
nine U.S. manufacturers;
2. In Elemental Sulfur from Canada, a fundamental shift in the nature of the industry and
an ambiguity about the original like product and domestic industry definitions;
3. In Melamine from Japan, a finding that a response by a company representing thirty-seven
percent of total domestic production (fifty percent of open market sales) was adequate;
4. In Stainless Steel Plate from Sweden, counsel to five domestic interested parties submitting
an aggregated response covering the five companies as well as two other U.S. producers
not represented by counsel;
5. In Synthetic Methionine from Japan, the domestic interested parties also being foreign
producers; and
6. In Sorbitol from France and in Anhydrous Sodium Metasilicate from France, a response
of a large domestic producer filed one day late.
None of these discussions thus yields any insight into how commissioners are determining
whether individual responses are adequate.
There was only one final determination issued in 1998. That was for the expedited review
of Elemental Sulfur from Canada. The ITC found that because of a significant shift in the
nature of the industry, injury was not likely if the order was revoked. The review was expedited
because only one domestic producer (representing seventeen percent of domestic production)
and one Canadian producer (representing a low percentage of imports and Canadian production)
responded. The fact that only they responded reflected the shift in the industry.
When the order was issued in 1973, sulfur produced through mining represented seventy-
nine percent of U.S. production, while in 1997, it represented only twenty-one percent.
The rest of the production stems from sulfur recovery during the production of petroleum,
sour natural gas, and petrochemicals. Such recovered sulfur cannot be stored or inventoried,
and therefore the price of elemental sulfur was not likely to affect the supply of recovered
sulfur. Further, because elemental sulfur is primarily used to produce sulfuric acid which,
in turn, is used to produce phosphate fertilizers, the price of sulfur did not significantly
affect its demand. Next, because of prior DOC revocations regarding particular companies,
the remaining imports subject to the order represented only twenty percent of imports
from Canada, and overall Canadian imports represented only 12.6 percent of U.S. sulfur
consumption. Therefore, the subject merchandise represented only 2.5 percent of the market
and would not be significant in the future. Additionally, the market share for total Canadian
imports had remained the same as before the issuance of the order despite the order's
issuance and despite the subsequent DOC revocations. Therefore there was no likelihood
significant increase if the order were revoked. Also, there were no barriers against the
import of such sulfur into other countries. The ITC further concluded the responding U.S.
company was vulnerable to injury from the increasing predominance of recovery sulfur,
but in any event that company constituted a minority of the U.S. industry. Because the
rest of the U.S. industry did not respond to the ITC, there was no data to show vulnerability
of the recovery sulfur producers.
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V. Trade Legislative Activity
A. SuMMARY
During 1998, no major trade legislative initiatives passed both the House and Senate. In
particular, legislation failed to pass both chambers in the following six key areas: (1) legislation
to articulate priority U.S. trade negotiating objectives and to renew the president's ability to
use special procedures in the House and Senate for consideration of implementing legislation
for trade agreements (so-called fast-track procedures), which was rejected by the House and
did not come up for a vote in the Senate; (2) the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which
passed the House but was not brought to a vote in the Senate; (3) Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI) enhancement legislation, which was rejected by the House and was not brought to a
vote in the Senate; (4) long-term extension of benefits under the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP) and Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs, which was not presented to
either the House or the Senate; (5) authorizations for USTR, the Customs Service, and the ITC,
which similarly was not voted on by the House or the Senate; and (6) legislation implementing the
OECD Shipbuilding Agreement, which also was not voted on by the House or the Senate.
The following trade legislation was enacted into law in 1998: (1) one-year extensions to
June 30, 1999, of the GSP and TAA programs; (2) substitution of the term normal trade
relations (NTR) for MFN treatment in the U.S. trade laws; and (3) increased monitoring by
the Customs Service of foreign products made with child labor. In addition, on June 25, the
Ways and Means Committee ordered adversely reported a resolution to disapprove renewal
of MFN treatment for China. 4 The House defeated the China resolution onJuly 22 (166-264).
On July 29, the Ways and Means Committee ordered adversely reported a resolution to
disapprove waiver authority for trade and investment relations with Vietnam. The House
defeated the Vietnam resolution on July 30 (16 3-260).
Finally, one major legislative initiative with an important relationship to trade passed the
Congress in 1998: additional IMF funding in response to the Asian financial crisis. A supplemen-
tal funding package of $18 billion passed the Congress as part of H.R. 4328, the omnibus
appropriations bill that was passed by the House on October 20, 1998, and by the Senate on
October 21.
In 1998, the two major trade legislative initiatives that failed to become law were those
(1) identifying trade negotiating objectives and extending trade implementing authority, and
(2) providing for improved trade relationships with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Each
of these is discussed in greater detail below.
B. NEGOTIATING OJEcrIVES AND TRADE AGREEMENT PROCEDuREs
OnJune 25, 1998, Speaker Gingrich announced that he would schedule House consideration
in September of legislation setting out trade negotiating objectives and renewing trade agreement
approval procedures. The scheduling of a vote on the legislation before the November elections
was regarded by the administration, most Democrats, and some in the private sector as primarily
a political move to embarrass the president and split the Democrats. Most Republicans and
84. Legislation changing the term MFN to NTR was signed into law on July 22, 1998, a month after the
committee reported the disapproval resolution and on the same day that the disapproval resolution failed in the
House. Accordingly, the term contained in the disapproval resolution was MFN rather than NTR.
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some others in the business community saw it as consistent with the administration's stated
commitment to pass legislation in this area.
On July 6, President Clinton responded to Speaker Gingrich, stating that while he was
strongly for fast track, it would be a mistake to call the legislation up if there was no reason
to believe that the legislation could pass. Doubts about the ability of the legislation to pass
had arisen in November 1997, when the bill had been pulled from floor consideration in the
House, over concerns that it did not have the votes to pass.
On July 31, the Senate Finance Committee marked up and reported S. 2400. Title II of
the bill contained trade negotiating objectives and trade agreement negotiating authority. The
provisions of S. 2400 overall were similar to, but different in a number of key respects from,
the provisions of H.R. 2621. For example, S. 2400 took a more traditional approach to the
question of whether implementing bills could include provisions that were necessary or appro-
priate to the implementation of the trade agreement, or could include only necessary provisions.
Without using the traditional terminology that had been contained in all fast-track provisions
from 1974 to 1991, section 2003(bX3) of S. 2400 would have sanctioned inclusion in implement-
ing legislation of provisions that are necessary for enforcement, and adjustment to the effects
of such trade agreement.
On September 25, H.R. 2621, the same bill reported in 1997 by the Committee on Ways
and Means (24-14), as modified by a Manager's Amendment developed by House Republicans,
was defeated by a roll call vote (180-243). The Manager's Amendment contained a number of
provisions related to agriculture and agricultural products, including stringent new requirements
related to tariff negotiations and language proposed by the Chairman of the Committee on
Agriculture. The bill also included a reporting requirement on the extent to which foreign
parties to trade agreements have in place laws governing exploitative child labor, but did not
address core issues concerning the relationship between trade agreements, on the one hand,
and the operation of labor markets and environmental regulation, on the other.
The president responded to the House vote by identifying the need to forge a new consensus
on trade, calling on the Congress to pass important trade-related legislation such as the African
Growth and Opportunity Act, CBI enhancement, and the IMF funding package, and stating
that we should do the hard work of building a bipartisan coalition for traditional negotiating
authority. The president also stated that he would work with Congress to pass bipartisan
legislation early in the 106th Congress.
On September 29, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Archer wrote to the
president, stating that he remained committed to passing fast track and agreed with the president
on the need to forge a new consensus on trade. Chairman Archer called on the president to
identify a date certain for a vote on fast-track legislation in 1999.
On October 2, Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee Ranking Democrat Robert Matsui,
together with Congressmen Dicks, Fazio, Hoyer, and Cardin, in turn wrote to Chairman
Archer stating that no fast track will win passage until a fair and bipartisan bill, which can
garner significant support from both sides of the aisle, is negotiated. The letter further stated
that it is dear that in order for any such negotiations to be fruitful, provisions related to labor
and the environment must be included in any bill that stands a chance at final passage.
C. AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY AcT
On March 11, 1998, H.R. 1432, the African Growth and Opportunity Act passed the
House (233-186). The bill extended GSP benefits to eligible sub-Saharan African countries for
ten years, added non-import-sensitive products to the program (including textiles and apparel)
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and provided quota-free treatment for textiles and apparel from countries that establish effective
measures against textile transshipments. The duty-free, quota-free treatment applied to apparel
assembled in sub-Saharan Africa from fabric and yarn produced in the United States, Africa,
or third countries. The bill also directed the president to develop a plan for the eventual
negotiation of a free trade agreement with sub-Saharan African countries and called for the
creation of a sub-Saharan Africa Economic Cooperation Forum. Finally, the bill also provided
equity and infrastructure funds and induded provisions supporting deep debt relief especially
for the poorest African countries under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPQ initiative
and development aid.
Tide I, Subtitle A of S. 2400, which was reported by the Senate Finance Committee on
July 31, 1998, induded trade provisions for sub-Saharan African countries based on the House
bill. S. 2400 granted duty-free, quota-free treatment only for apparel (not textiles) assembled
from U.S. fabric made with U.S. yam (either cut in the United States, or cut and assembled
in sub-Saharan Africa from U.S. thread), as well as handmade, hand-loomed, folklore articles.
(This more limited coverage was defeated as part of a motion to recommit the House bill by
a vote of 193-224.) The Senate bill contained other trade provisions similar to the House bill,
but did not include aid provisions, which were in the jurisdiction of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations.
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